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Abstract 
Does genetic distance between countries explain differences in the level of entrepreneurship 
between them? Genetic distance, or very long-term divergence in intergenerationally transmitted 
traits across populations, has been recently tied to a variety of outcomes ranging from differences 
in economic development to differences in risk preferences between countries. Extending this 
recent work, we ask whether the genetic distance between countries is associated with 
differences in new firm entry. Based on a sample of 103 countries and 5,253 country-pair 
observations and controlling for a large variety of factors, we find that genetic distance is 
positively associated with between country differences in new firm entry. The effects sizes, as 
expected, are small. In assessing the differences in entrepreneurial activity between country-
pairs, policymakers could consider adjusting for genetic distance as an explanation for 
differences in entrepreneurial activity.  
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 2 
 
1 Introduction 
Researchers have examined a number of factors that influence the differences in rates of 
entrepreneurship across countries, ranging from tax rates (Hubbard 1998) to availability of 
capital for new firms (Amit et al. 1998) and from entrepreneurial culture (Krueger et al. 2013) 
and institutions supporting entrepreneurship (Hébert and Link 1988) to differences in socio-
cultural norms (Aldrich and Fiol 1994; Thornton et al. 2011). At the root of social, political, 
institutional and economic differences between countries that explain the differences in 
entrepreneurship could be the genetic distance between countries, or “a measure associated with 
the time elapsed since two populations’ last common ancestors,” (Spolaore and Wacziarg 2009: 
469). A series of studies have shown that, controlling for a variety of factors, genetic distance 
could explain between-country differences in technology, productivity (Spolaore and Wacziarg 
2009), innovation and growth (Gorodnichenko and Roland 2017), risk-taking (Becker et al. 
2014), trust (Guiso et al. 2009), income and economic development (Bai and Kung 2011; 
Spolaore and Wacziarg 2013) and well-being (Burger et al. 2015).  
The aforementioned relationships between genetic distance and differences in a variety of 
between country-level outcomes, suggest accumulating evidence that points to the possibility 
that the genetic distance between two countries may be associated with differences in the rates of 
new firm entry between countries. Moving from prior studies in entrepreneurship on individual 
level biological characteristics and drawing on work linking genetic distance at the country level, 
we provide the first empirical test of the relationship between genetic distance and differences in 
entrepreneurship between countries.  
Specifically, based on Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) we examine the association 
between a country’s genetic distance from the world’s technological frontier (the US) and new 
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 3 
firm entry. The choice of the US as a reference point in measuring genetic distance between two 
countries is based on Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), who posit that geographic, cultural and 
genetic distance to the US is associated with a country’s technological development. Their 
measure, based on Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994),  is the time elapsed since two population groups 
existed as a single panmimitic population and posits that genetic distance proxies a divergence in 
traits “biologically and/or culturally” that add barriers to the diffusion of technology (Campbell 
and Pyun 2017). 
We test the relationship between the weighted genetic distance between pairs of 103 
countries (5,253 country-pair observations) and the differences in the entrepreneurial entry. 
Based on casewise deletion, in a sample of 820 country-pair observations, the inferences were 
consistent.  Controlling for a wide range of measures including geographical, cultural, religious, 
linguistic, and historical differences, we find that genetic distance has a statistically significant 
impact on the differences in the new firm entry between countries. Adding to works of Spolaore 
and Wacziarg (2009) we include several additional controls -- Hofstede's cultural dimensions 
(inferences were also robust to the inclusion of cultural dimensions from the World Value 
Survey), Worldwide Governance Indicators, legal origin and additional economic factors. The 
inclusion of these additional controls further adds to the robustness of our inferences. We find 
that, for one standard deviation increase in genetic distance between two countries, the difference 
in the start-up rate ranges from 1.100 to 1.120 firms per 1,000 working-age population (those 
ages 15-64). While a complex set of factors could explain the efficacy of policies promoting 
entrepreneurship, in the current analysis, the variance explained by genetic distance is small but 
significant. 
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 4 
It is also important to emphasize that our study is not about identifying differences in 
specific genetic polymorphisms that directly influence entrepreneurship at the individual level.  
Genetic polymorphisms are heritable genetic differences among individuals (Ding and Zhang 
2010). Our study focuses on neutral genetic distance among countries (Spolaore and Wacziarg 
2009) and not on specific genetic traits.  
Neutral genetic distance is based on neutral genetic markers that are independent of 
historic natural selection pressures and hence do not directly influence survival and fitness in the 
short-term (Spolaore and Wacziarg 2009). As a result, our study is not about certain countries 
having a higher prevalence of specific genetic traits that directly increase the rates of 
entrepreneurship. Instead, genetic distance can be interpreted as an overall measure that captures 
a combination of intergenerationally transmitted characteristics between two countries that could 
explain the differences in the rates of entrepreneurship. 
 
2 Theoretical Background 
We emphasize that our study is conducted at the between country-pair distance level of analysis 
even though we review genetic differences at the individual level as one of the multiple strands 
in the development of our argument. Traditional entrepreneurship literature shows that a variety 
of factors at different levels – individual, firm, and institutions – are associated with 
entrepreneurial activity. Individual-level factors that influence entrepreneurial activity include 
personality (Baum et al. 2014), cognition (Mitchell et al. 2007), affect (Baron 2008), and passion 
(Cardon et al. 2009), among others. While individual and firm-related differences significantly 
affect success in entrepreneurial activity, systematic differences still prevail in entrepreneurial 
activity across countries (Ács et al. 2014; Blanchflower et al. 2001; Klapper et al. 2010).  
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 5 
Closer to our empirical context, but not directly related to it, is the literature on the role of 
biological characteristics at the individual level and self-employment outcomes. We briefly 
discuss this below, however, we do not draw on this as the basis of our hypothesis.  
 
2.1 Biology and self-employment 
While institutional and cultural factors explain cross-country differences in entrepreneurship, 
biological factors associated with entrepreneurship have recently been studied. In providing a 
brief overview of this literature, we emphasize that genetic predispositions to entrepreneurship 
are not weighted differently when calculating genetic distance at the country level as the measure 
of genetic distance focuses on neutral genetic distance between countries and not on specific 
genetic traits that must be weighed differently to derive the overall genetic distance measure 
associated with entrepreneurship. Neutral genetic distance is based on neutral genetic markers 
that are independent of historic natural selection pressures and hence do not directly influence 
survival and fitness in the short-term (Spolaore and Wacziarg 2009:5). Below we provide a non-
exhaustive review of the biology and entrepreneurship literature and refer interested readers to 
Nofal et al. (2018). The purpose of discussing this literature as a backdrop is to provide an 
understanding of the role of biology in entrepreneurship-related outcomes in general and not to 
provide intuition for the proposed hypothesis.  
Studies on biology and entrepreneurship have found evidence of heritability for self-
employment using studies of twins (Nicolaou et al., 2008) and adoptees (Lindquist et al. 2015). 
Studies have also shown that testosterone is associated with self-employment (Bönte et al. 2016; 
Greene et al. 2014). In addition, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (Antshel 2017; Verheul 
et al. 2015; Verheul et al. 2016) and dyslexia (Hessels et al. 2014) are more prevalent among the 
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 6 
self-employed. Studies have also advocated the use of neuroscientific methods to understand 
better the decision making patterns of the self-employed (de Holan 2014).  
 Complementing this rich body of work, we now zoom-out to between country genetic 
distance, to explain between-country differences in new firm entry.  
 
2.2 Country-level differences in self-employment 
A complex combination of social, cultural, institutional, and government factors have been 
shown to sustain cross-country differences in entrepreneurship over time. Work in comparative 
economics (Djankov et al. 2002), trade (Foss and Klein 2005) and public policy (Audretsch et al. 
2007) have highlighted the role of government policies and country-level characteristics in 
explaining differences in entrepreneurial activity across countries. Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions have been associated with cross-country differences in entrepreneurial activities 
(Hayton and Cacciotti 2013). Cultural values and beliefs socially program individuals to engage 
in or to avoid entrepreneurship (Thomas and Mueller 2000), and cultural differences related to 
uncertainty avoidance or materialism explain differences in entrepreneurship rates. In addition to 
cultural differences, differences in economic conditions could also explain differences in 
entrepreneurial activities. Differences in policies ranging from bankruptcy laws to credit for 
private firms also explain differences in entrepreneurial activity among countries (King and 
Levine 1993).  
There is also some related research on differences in psychological traits and differences 
in rates of entrepreneurship. For example, Rentfrow et al. (2008) used data from over half a 
million people in the US and found that geographic variation in psychological traits may lead to 
macro-level differences among regions. In a related paper, Obschonka et al. (2013) found 
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 7 
evidence of regional clustering in an entrepreneurship-prone personality profile using data from 
the US, Germany and the UK.  
While differences in entrepreneurial activity among countries could be explained by 
economic and technological, cultural and institutional differences (Grilo and Thurik 2005), the 
genetic distance between two countries could have been the harbinger of these differences over 
time. The need to focus on differences in new firm entry is particularly salient because, despite 
global integration, there continue to be systematic and persistent differences across countries in 
entrepreneurship activities. It is plausible that genetic distance between countries could lead to 
complex social processes over time that drive differences in cultural and political institutions that 
may, in turn, influence the differences in new firm entry.  
Genetic distance between two countries is a result of complex migration patterns over 
thousands of years, a systematic path-dependent process that resulted from historic patterns of 
trade and migration. While the difference in entrepreneurship levels may thus not be solely 
explained by bottom-up micro-level behaviors of individual entrepreneurs, they could also be 
explained by top-down systematic genetic distances between countries. Indirectly supporting this 
conjecture is the growing evidence that genetic differences at the country-level influence 
differences in economic development and risk-taking, technology, and trust. Differences in 
entrepreneurship-related behaviors may be a result of long-term population stasis – systematic 
differences in genes among countries – that may explain differences in the level of 
entrepreneurship.  
We propose that increasing genetic distance between two countries is positively 
associated with differences in entrepreneurial activity between two countries. Due to the lack of 
a systematic theoretical framework explaining the association between genetic distance and 
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between-country differences in entrepreneurship, instead of providing robust theoretical 
arguments, the proposed arguments are geared towards building an intuition towards the 
proposed association.  
 
2.3 Genetic distance and Entrepreneurship 
The concept of genetic distance is derived from the seminal work of Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) 
and is a measure of the difference in allelic frequencies across populations. A brief examination 
of the measure of genetic distance begins by considering genes, which are segments of DNA that 
encode for a certain function. An allele refers to different variants of a particular gene. The 
measure of genetic distance is essentially a summary of the differences in these alleles across 
different populations. Most significantly, genetic distance draws on neutral markers and not on 
selected traits (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009). As a result, our study is definitely, unequivocally, 
not about specific genetic polymorphisms that directly matter for entrepreneurship. 
A small but increasing number of studies have investigated the relationship between 
genetic distance and differences in economic and non-economic factors between countries. 
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) found that as a country’s genetic distance increased, the 
differences in per capita income also increased. Recently, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016) found 
that genetic distance was positively associated with linguistic, cultural and religious distance, and 
Proto and Oswald (2017) discovered a relationship between genetic distance and differences in 
well-being.  
A related, but distinct concept to genetic distance is that of genetic diversity. “Genetic 
distance refers to genetic differences between populations while genetic diversity is defined in 
terms of heterogeneity within populations” (Spolaore and Wacziarg 2013: 355). Ashraf and 
Galor (2013) found a hump-shaped relationship between genetic diversity and economic 
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 9 
development both before colonial periods and in the modern era. Genetic distance and genetic 
diversity seem to explain different aspects of genetic effects. Ashraf and Galor (2013) found that 
genetic diversity has decreasing returns to development, and Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) 
found that lower genetic distance increases development. These findings are complementary as 
Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) seem to have found support for the left side of hump-shaped 
effects found by Ashraf and Galor (2013) – thus, lower genetic differences ease the ‘transaction 
costs’ of coordination.  
While we focus on the differences in new firm registrations between countries predicted 
by genetic distance, it is possible that genetic distance may also influence a range of country-
level differences in the evolution of institutions, inequality, participation from the citizens, 
among others. We propose that genetic distance between a country-pair is likely to be associated 
with differences in entrepreneurship between a country-pair. Our intuition is rooted in the logic 
that genetic distance between country-pairs drives “divergence in the whole set of implicit 
beliefs, customs, habits, biases, conventions, etc. that are transmitted across generations—
biologically and/or culturally—with high persistence” (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009: 471).  
Longer genetic distance has been associated with differential risk attitudes between 
populations (Becker et al., 2014), which may in turn also explain differences in entrepreneurship. 
Specifically, Becker et al. (2014) found that countries at shorter genetic distance had lower 
differences in risk attitudes. In related literature, there is heterogeneity in risk attitudes across 
countries (Flak et al. 2018), while risk attitudes have been shown to exhibit a genetic 
predisposition (Kuhnen and Chiao 2009). It is therefore possible that differences in genetic 
distance between populations may also be associated with differences in entrepreneurial activity. 
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Again, we emphasize that while we cannot measure the above mechanisms, our logic is 
based on the premise that, in genealogically distant country pairs, traits and characteristics 
between the two populations are likely to be distinct (Spolaore and Wacziarg 2009) and that, in 
turn, may influence the differences in entrepreneurial activities. Overall, the discussion above 
suggests that genetic distance is likely to be associated with cross-country differences in the rates 
of entrepreneurship. 
Hypothesis: Longer genetic distance between two countries is positively associated with 
differences in new firm entries between two countries. 
 
3 Methods  
3.1 Data sources 
Our sample includes 103 countries and 5,253 pairwise observations that result from the matching 
data on genetic distance (Spolaore and Wacziarg 2009), with data on new firm density from the 
Doing Business report from the WorldBank Group i, the United States Census Bureau data on 
Business Dynamics Statistics, and Federal Reserve (https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/). 
 Because the association of genetic distance could confound with a variety of country-
level factors, Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) used a wide range of controls. To further add 
robustness to our inferences, in addition to including all controls in Spolaore and Wacziarg 
(2009), we also included several additional controls related to Hofstede's cultural dimensions 
(and also tested for additional cultural dimensions from World Value Survey), Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, legal origin and economic characteristics.  
  
 
 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 11 
3.2 Empirical Specification 
In order to investigate the relationship between the genetic distance between two countries and 
differences in the new firm entry between the two countries, we explored three specifications 
(Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009). The first and second specifications consider genetic distance 
relative to the United States of America, the ‘technological frontier’ as proposed by Spolaore and 
Wacziarg (2009), and calculate the genetic distance of every country relative to the US. In the 
first model, we examine the relationship between a country’s genetic distance from the US and 
its level of entrepreneurial activity, while in the second specification we examine the relationship 
between a country’s genetic distance from the US and the difference in entrepreneurial activity 
from the USii.  
The third specification specifies a bilateral model, taking the absolute difference in 
entrepreneurial activity between pairs of countries and the weighted genetic distance for that pair 
(Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009). The baseline specification for the third model is: 
ijij
D
ijji XGyy   'loglog 210  
where represents the absolute weighted genetic distance between country i and j; ky is the 
entrepreneurial activity for country k; ijX  is a vector of the control variables; and ij  is the error 
term.  The dependent variable is the difference in log of the average number of newly registered 
companies in country i and j; the absolute value reduces the spatial dependence in the dependent 
variable.  
The second specification is of a similar form to the third specification, except that the 
genetic difference between countries 
D
ijG  is replaced by the difference in relative distances to the 
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US, R
USj
R
USi
R
ij GGG ,,  , giving the equation ijij
R
ijji XGyy  ˆ'
ˆˆˆloglog 210  where 
any pairs where i or j are the US are excluded.   
 Because many countries are made up of different ethnic groups that are genetically 
different,  it is important to use a weighted genetic distance measure that adjusts for genetic 
distance and the share of each ethnic group in a country (Alesina et al. 2003; Spolaore and 
Wacziarg 2009).  Assuming country A contains ethnic groups i=1….I and country B contains 
ethnic groups j=1….J ; pAi is the share of ethnic group i in country A and pBj is the share of ethnic 
group j in country B; and dij is the genetic distance between ethnic groups i and j. The weighted 
measure of genetic distance (FST) is then given by: 
𝐹𝑆𝑇 = ∑ ∑(𝑝𝐴𝑖 × 𝑝𝐵𝑗 × 𝑑𝑖𝑗
𝐽
𝑗=1
)
𝐼
𝑖=1
 
 
3.3 Estimation Procedure 
We emphasize that the genetic distance between pairs of countries could be driven by historic 
migration flows between two pairs of countries. Cultural and linguistic similarities, economic 
opportunities, among others (Gorodnichenko and Roland 2017; Günther and Jakobsson 2016) 
could have further influenced historic migration patterns. As such, due to historic bilateral 
migration patterns, genetic distance could be endogenous, that is, the unobservables related to 
bilateral migration patterns between country-pairs in the error term of the regression could 
influence both between country genetic distance and entrepreneurship activity. As such, 
causation is not implied and correlation is inferred in the testing of the proposed model.  
We run two-way clustered standard error regressions based on all three specifications 
listed in the previous section. This estimation procedure calculates standard errors that account 
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for two dimensions of within-cluster correlation between countries in a pair (Petersen 2009). The 
two dimensions are country i and country j, thereby allowing us to control for shared unobserved 
characteristics between country i and country j. Moreover, this estimation procedure provides 
more conservative estimates by controlling for spatial correlation between two countries 
(Cameron et al. 2011). Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) provided an example of how spatial 
correlation can be present in a pairwise approach. With an illustration of three countries, the 
authors refered to the case where the observations for the dependent variable, 21 loglog yy   and 
31 loglog yy  are correlated due to the presence of one of the countries (𝑦1) in both 
observations. In such a case, using simple least-squares standard errors, would lead to inflated 
estimates due to spatial (cross-sectional) correlations.  Furthermore, we have bilateral variables 
such as genetic distance and geodesic distance in the right-hand-side of the equation. 
 
3.4 Measures 
3.4.1 Differences in New Firm Entry 
Our dependent variable is the difference in the startup rate between two countries. Start-up rate is 
defined as the number of new limited liability firms per 1,000 working-age people (15-64 years 
old). Based on the specification, we take the absolute difference in the log of the average number 
of newly registered companies for the period 2008 to 2010iii. We take the natural log to reduce 
the influence of skewed rates of differences in entrepreneurship observed for some countries and 
to increase normality in the distribution of the outcome variable. The data were obtained from 
the Doing Business report from the WorldBank Group. Because no data were available from this 
report for the United States of America, we collected data from United States Census Bureau, 
Business Dynamics Statisticsiv and the Federal Reserve Economic Data - FRED - St. Louis Fed.v 
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 3.4.2 Genetic Distance 
The genetic distance variable represents the absolute weighted genetic distance between 
countries i and j, representing the genealogical relatedness of two randomly chosen individuals, 
one from each country (Spolaore and Wacziarg 2009: 485). Higher values are associated with 
larger differences (Spolaore and Wacziarg 2009).vi This information was also used to calculate 
pairwise differences for the alternative specification.  
 
3.4.3 Control variables 
We draw on a comprehensive set of controls variables. These could be broadly classified into 
geographical factors (geodesic distance, latitudinal distance and longitudinal distance), micro-
geographical factors (contiguity, landlocked, island and elevation), continent effects, common 
history variables (linguistic distance, religion distance, colony, common colonizer, current 
colonial and colonial relationship) and other controls (cultural, governance, institutional and 
economic factors). We describe the variables in Appendix Table A1.  
 
3.5 Results  
In the Appendix, Tables A1 and A2 present the descriptive statistics and correlations, 
respectively. The list of countries in the sample is included in Table A6. The mean of the start-up 
rate is 1.710 new firms per thousand working-age population and the mean of genetic distance is 
0.10, which is in line with the value in Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) (in their 9,316 pairs of 
observations the mean was 0.11). Our genetic distance bears a positive correlation of 0.10 
(p<0.001) with the start-up rate. 
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Table 1 presents the unilateral regressions to the technological frontier, the USA. To 
facilitate the interpretations of the effects sizes, in the last row we list the standardized beta 
coefficient of the genetic distance variable. The standardized beta refers to how the standard 
deviation of firm density changes for each standard deviation change in genetic distance. Model 
1 includes genetic distance without any controls. The coefficient of genetic distance is positive 
and significant (p<0.01). Model 2 includes genetic distance and the average number of new firms 
for the countries in the pair. In Model 3 we also add the control variables related to geographical 
factors, while Model 4 includes all of the remaining control variables. The coefficient of genetic 
distance retains its significance in all four models. The results show that genetic distance is 
positively associated with the difference in the level of new firm entry from the technological 
frontier. However, when including the controls, the magnitude of effects decreases. For model 1 
using standardized beta coefficient in the last row, for 1 s.d. increase in genetic distance there is 
e0.210 = 1.234 increase in startups per 1,000 working age individuals. Using similar calculations 
for all the remaining models, for 1 s.d. increase in genetic distance, the difference in the start-up 
rate to the technological frontier ranges from 1.047 to 1.234 firms per 1,000 working-age 
population (those ages 15-64).  
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 2 presents the results of the two-way clustered standard errors bilateral regressions. 
Model 1 includes genetic distance and we add control variables in model 2 (just the average 
number of new firms for the countries in the pair) to model 8 (all controls). The coefficient of 
genetic distance is positive and significant, indicating that genetic distance is positively 
associated with cross-country differences in the start-up rate, except for models 3 and 6, with 
both using geographic controls; perhaps significant collinearity among the closely correlated 
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geographic characteristics related to geographic location, continent, contiguity with other 
countries may also influence the extent of genetic distance. In the full model, where we include 
these and other controls, the coefficient of genetic distance is significant. Based on the estimates, 
for 1 s.d. increase in genetic distance, the difference in the start-up rate ranges from 1.047 to 
1.134 firms per 1,000 working-age population (those ages 15-64). For example, for model 8 
using the standardized beta coefficient, 1.070 is calculated as e0.068=1.070. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
3.6 Robustness Checks and Extensions  
3.6.1 Alternate Measure of Genetic Distance 
Although the findings are robust to controlling for an extensive set of control variables, we first 
test if the findings are robust to an alternative operationalization of genetic distance – 𝑁𝑒𝑖 genetic 
distance proposed by Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994). The estimates from this alternative measure of 
genetic distance were consistent with the results (Table 3). 
 [INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
3.6.2 Casewise deletion 
In our analysis in Tables 2 and 3, the sample size varies across models because we do not use the 
casewise deletion restriction across all the models. To check that the findings are not an artifact 
of such a restriction, in Table A3 and A4 (Appendix), we use casewise deletion across all models 
and include the Hofstede cultural dimensions. The findings are consistent with the main 
inferences.  
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3.6.3 Alternate cultural distance measures 
In Table A4 in the Appendix, we used the Hofstede’s cultural distance measure. As an additional 
analysis, based on cultural dimensions in the World Value Survey (WVS), we used the 
composite measure of cultural distance (model 1, Table A4) and the five individual dimensions 
of cultural distance (Perceptions of Life; Work-Family; Politics and Society; Religion and 
Morale; and National Identity; model 2, Table A4). The inferences based on casewise deletion 
were consistent with the main inferences.  
 
4. Discussion 
Based on recent developments in measuring the between-country genetic distance, we tested for 
its association with differences in new firm entry. We ran unilateral (Table 1) and bilateral 
(Tables 2 and 3) regressions with country clustering to draw robust inferences. We controlled for 
a significant set of variables, in addition to those controlled by Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), to 
limit the effects of alternate explanations for the identified relationships. The findings, after 
controlling for factors ranging from cultural factors to historical events such as colonization and 
from institutional factors to religion, indicated that genetic distance is associated with cross-
country differences in the rates of entrepreneurship. The effects sizes are small and, depending 
on the specification, 1 s.d. increase in genetic distance, the difference in the start-up rate ranges 
from 1.047 to 1.134 firms per 1,000 working-age population (those ages 15-64).  
Our study also extends the biosocial model of entrepreneurship (Shane and Nicolaou 
2015; White et al. 2007) to genetic distance influencing cross-country differences in 
entrepreneurship. Although research has confirmed a larger role of ‘nurture’ relative to ‘nature’ 
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in influencing the choice to become an entrepreneur, biology is an important, though not a 
deterministic, factor in entrepreneurship (Nicolaou and Shane 2014).  
Factors such as genetic distance could be discounted as ‘something one cannot control, so 
why bother.’ In fact, the findings contribute to these rebukes in the following ways. First, as our 
results can be viewed as evidence of continued long-term effects of barriers across different 
countries due to migration patterns and institutional differences, significant reductions in 
entrepreneurial disparities across nations can be achieved by implementing policies that reduce 
such barriers, such as encouraging cross-country trade, exchanges, the diffusion of 
entrepreneurial ideas, and openness (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009). The identified relationship 
suggests the value of encouraging the diffusion of ideas across countries, which can overcome 
‘resistance’ from genetic distance. Furthermore, without knowing the relative effects of factors 
such as genetic distance on entrepreneurial activity, estimates of alternate factors driving 
entrepreneurship would be conflated. Related to studies on twins, as genes explain a significant 
portion of the likelihood of entrepreneurship, non-inclusion of such factors could lead to 
conflated estimates of its correlates such as personality. In a similar vein, at the least, controlling 
for genetic distance in research on country-wise differences in entrepreneurship rates may 
provide more reliable inferences.  
The association between genetic distance and differences in rates of entrepreneurship 
complements recent work on the association between biology and entrepreneurship. Using 
samples of identical and fraternal twins, research has shown that genes influence the tendency to 
become entrepreneurs and recognize entrepreneurial opportunities  (Nicolaou et al. 2008; 
Nicolaou et al. 2009), while a related stream of research has also examined the role of genetically 
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influenced hormones in entrepreneurship (Unger et al. 2015; White et al. 2006). Thus, interest in 
biology and entrepreneurship has increased significantly in recent years.  
The findings also open up new research questions on cross-country differences that 
explain the differences in the levels of entrepreneurship between countries. If genetic distance 
drives differences in human behavior, such influences should converge and coalesce to develop 
distinct cultures and institutions. Path-dependent migratory patterns would lead to the 
development of complex country related differences. While work on population ecology has 
called into question the value of entrepreneurial agency, the findings indicate that, while genetic 
distance is a significant explanatory factor, a significant amount of variance also remains 
unexplained. This indicates that genetic distance is an important but not a definitive explanation 
of cross-country differences in entrepreneurship.  
 Future research may identify mediators in the relationship between genetic distance and 
differences in entrepreneurial activity. Research by personality psychologists on country-level 
personality traits would be useful in this respect (Schmitt et al. 2007). Explaining the relationship 
between genetic differences and cultural influence, Bleidorn et al. (2013) find that normative life 
transitions to adult roles explain personality outcomes (or, social-investment theory), thereby 
indirectly not finding support for genetic factors explaining personality differences. Future 
research could assess whether individual-level entrepreneurial personality is based on social 
investment theory or genetic factors. While we focus on between-country differences in new firm 
establishments, Obschonka et al. (2013) found that entrepreneurial personality is regionally 
clustered within the US, Germany, and the UK. Based on these findings, variations in the genetic 
distance within a country could explain the clustering of entrepreneurial activities. Accordingly, 
future work can examine whether country-level personality traits mediate the genetic distance-
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entrepreneurship relationship. Proposing an Entrepreneurial Personality System, Obschonka and 
Stuetzer (2017) found support for “gravity effect of an intraindividual entrepreneurial Big Five 
profile on the more malleable psychological factors” (page 203). This complex confluence of 
genetic, cultural, and individual factors explaining self-employment outcomes is indeed an 
important area for future research.  
 
4.1 Limitations 
Our study has several limitations. First, we explicitly acknowledge that the findings may be 
confounded by geographic factors. In other words, without identifying an instrumental 
variable(s) that separates the effects of geographic factors on genetic distance we do not know if 
genetic distance or geographic factors are influencing the results. In Table 2 (models 3 and 6), 
when including geographic controls along with genetic distance, the effect of genetic distance is 
non-significant, perhaps due to partial determination of genetic distance by geographic controls 
(Geodesic distance, Latitudinal distance, Longitudinal distance, Contiguous, Landlocked, Island, 
Elevation,  North America Both,  South America Both,  Asia Both,  Africa Both,  Europe Both,  
Pacific Both). Future research limiting the collinearity between geographic factors and genetic 
distance may provide more reliable inferences on the influence of genetic distance on the 
differences in entrepreneurship rates between countries.  
Second, we are unable to explain the macro- or meso-level relationships among the 
cultural and institutional factors, albeit we control for these factors. These developments are a 
result of complex historical and social process, the variance of which may not be fully captured 
in an almost steady state time series available in country-level research. The relationships that 
are in stasis for a long period of time cannot be fully explained by variance based methodologies, 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 21 
but instead by steady-state econometrics with long-term data that are seldom available for the 
phenomenon we study here.  
Furthermore, the new firm entry data for the US are not available from the World Bank, 
and therefore we collated this measure for the US from the US Census Bureau. While there is no 
reason to doubt the data quality from the US Census Bureau, we believe that more uniform data 
collation from the reporting agencies in different countries may reduce plausible idiosyncrasies 
in collation procedures across countries.  
Third, while the inferences relate to the genetic distance among populations, the study 
does not explain the regional differences within countries. For example, while genetic distances 
within continents are likely to be lower than between continents, the within-country variation and 
the resulting differences in entrepreneurship within a country require further elaboration.  
Fourth, a significant amount of R-square remains unexplained, indirectly cautioning that 
genetic distance and the included controls still explain a relatively small amount of variance in 
entrepreneurship related differences between countries and that micro- and meso-level effects 
could play a larger role in explaining systematic variations in entrepreneurship. Although our 
level of analysis is at the country-level, within-country differences in the genetic distance could 
not be fully ruled out. Such differences could explain differences in entrepreneurial activity 
within a country. Strong regional inequalities in entrepreneurial activities pointed out in recent 
literature (Bosma and Schutjens 2011), focus on sub-regional genetic distance and differences in 
entrepreneurial activities could add further insights on the role of genetic distance in explaining 
differences in entrepreneurial outcomes.   
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Fifth, the study focused on 103 countries where data based on pair-wise deletion were 
available. However, the findings could not be generalized to countries where such data are not 
available.  
Sixth, increasing migration from developing to developed countries in the last two 
decades could attenuate the effects of genetic distance on between-country differences in startup 
rates. With an increasing number of immigrants selecting into high-tech entrepreneurship (Hart 
and Acs 2011; Saxenian 2002), the effects of genetic distance on differences in entrepreneurial 
activity between developed-developing country pairs could have upward bias wherein 
entrepreneurial human capital gaps are increased due to higher migration from developing to 
developed countries. Migration between developed countries may lower the differences in 
human capital between countries (e.g., migration among EU nations), thereby reducing the 
differences in entrepreneurial activity between developed-developed country pairs. Conversely, 
migration may also increase the differences in human capital between countries (e.g., brain drain 
from developing countries),  thereby increasing gap in entrepreneurial activity between 
developed-developing country pairs. Finally, a complex combination of environmental, cultural, 
economic, and social factors at multiple levels come into confluence to explain entrepreneurial 
activity. The individual, country, and between country levels of interactions result in endogenous 
processes that are difficult to parse out theoretically and empirically. We therefore caution that 
the inferences in this study are subject to omitted variable bias and the influence of the 
unobservables, operating at multiple levels of analysis, in the error term of the regression is not 
fully taken into account.  
 In closing, the findings must be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, after including a 
variety of control variables and specifying alternate regressions, the role of genetic distance in 
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explaining differences in the new firm entry should not be discounted either. The aim of the 
study is not to suggest that countries with longer or shorter genetic distances are better positioned 
in their entrepreneurial capabilities. Indeed, genetic distance is a result of the long-term 
migration process. Nevertheless, controlling for a large number of country-specific effects, the 
genetic distance may be an important structural predictor in explaining differences in new firm 
entry between countries.   
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Table 1 Two-way clustered standard errors unilateral regressions to the technological frontier 
US 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
 DV = Difference in Start-up rate relative to the US 
(number of new limited liability firms per 1,000 
working-age individuals relative to the US) 
Genetic distance 4.2992*** 3.4573*** 0.9471** 1.0446*** 
 
(20.4190) (15.5973) (2.2811) (4.6599) 
Pairwise average number firms  -0.7302*** -1.0567*** -0.6062*** 
  (-17.4865) (-38.4014) (-28.0802) 
Geodesic distance   -0.0353*** -0.0542*** 
 
  (-11.8465) (-5.3433) 
Latitudinal distance   0.0077*** 0.0108*** 
 
  (7.4590) (17.7169) 
Longitudinal distance   0.0048*** 0.0029*** 
 
  (16.2835) (3.8713) 
Contiguous   -0.2704*** -0.1493*** 
 
  (-4.9613) (-3.6132) 
Landlocked   0.3447*** 0.4137*** 
 
  (2.9840) (2.9071) 
Island   0.4992*** 0.4719*** 
 
  (9.9638) (11.1794) 
Linguistic distance    1.1503 
 
   (0.8618) 
Religion distance    0.3945*** 
 
   (10.4279) 
Constant 0.8877*** 1.1573*** 0.9691*** -0.3419 
 
(12.0861) (12.9470) (13.3095) (-0.2675) 
Observations (pairwise between 
USA and country i) 102 102 102 100 
R-squared 0.0443 0.0763 0.1817 0.1967 
Standardized beta of  Genetic 
distance 
0.210 
0.169 0.046 0.051 
Notes. The dependent variable is start-up rate. The independent variables include genetic distance and a set of 
controls. Refer to the text for detailed variable definitions. The STATA code was obtained from Professor Mitchell 
Petersen’s website and is: dependent_variable independent_variables, fcluster(country i)  tcluster(country j).  
Table A6 (Appendix) presents the list of countries. 
t-statistics in parentheses. † p < 0.10, *  p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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Table 2 Two-way clustered standard errors bilateral regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Genetic 
distance 
With average 
number of 
firms (log) for 
the countries 
With 
geographical 
controls 
With 
religion 
linguistics 
and colony 
With 
governance 
indicators 
With 
geographical 
controls, 
religion 
linguistics 
and colony 
and 
governance 
indicators 
With 
economic 
development 
and law 
system Full model 
 Start-up rate between two pairs of countries i and j (number of new limited liability firms per 1,000 working-age individuals between two 
pairs of countries i and j) 
Genetic distance 1.8734** 2.2097** 0.8941 2.1649** 1.6918** 1.0704 2.4634** 1.3244* 
 
(2.1753) (2.4104) (0.9840) (2.3015) (2.3341) (1.1038) (2.4921) (1.7884) 
Pairwise average number 
firms   0.4145*** 0.5968*** 0.5058*** 0.3958** 0.6628*** 0.9001*** 1.0411*** 
  (2.6236) (3.8854) (3.2021) (2.5654) (4.0732) (4.6765) (6.0658) 
Geodesic distance   -0.0055   -0.0013  0.0171 
 
  (-0.2957)   (-0.0575)  (0.9788) 
Latitudinal distance   -0.0047**   -0.0037  -0.0018 
 
  (-2.0927)   (-1.5792)  (-0.9396) 
Longitudinal distance   0.0006   -0.0004  0.0008 
 
  (0.4282)   (-0.2110)  (0.5646) 
Contiguous   -0.2920**   -0.1586  0.1465 
 
  (-2.1848)   (-1.2806)  (1.0198) 
Landlocked   0.4960**   0.5053**  0.0437 
 
  (2.1354)   (2.1713)  (0.4418) 
Island   0.3556**   0.2978*  0.2547** 
 
  (2.4494)   (1.8658)  (2.5683) 
Elevation   -0.0002   -0.0002  -0.0001 
 
  (-1.4186)   (-1.5456)  (-1.4838) 
North America Both   -0.0137   0.0315  0.0232 
 
  (-0.3077)   (0.7955)  (0.7245) 
South America Both   -0.1834***   -0.0553  -0.2081 
 
  (-3.9817)   (-0.3840)  (-1.5357) 
Asia Both   0.0123   0.0192  0.1306*** 
 
  (0.1862)   (0.2879)  (4.0029) 
Africa Both   0.0975**   0.1155**  0.1053 
 
  (2.5038)   (2.5633)  (.) 
Europe Both   -0.1939***   -0.1590***  0.0094 
 
  (-4.3131)   (-3.6996)  (0.4998) 
Pacific Both   0.0829** 
  
-0.2160** 
 -
0.1502*** 
 
  (2.5756)   (-2.5591)  (-3.3939) 
Lingustic Distance    0.0013  0.3850  -0.0743 
 
   (0.0015)  (0.3658)  (-0.1469) 
Religion distance    0.3918***  0.3116***  0.0346 
 
   (3.5065)  (2.9454)  (0.6215) 
Colony    -0.4387**  -0.2425  -0.1745 
 
   (-2.2237)  (-1.3866)  (-1.1129) 
Common Colonizer    0.0987  -0.0909  -0.0161 
 
   (0.7229)  (-0.5587)  (-0.1449) 
Colonial relationship    0.6095***  0.2796*  0.0969 
 
   (3.3657)  (1.8192)  (0.6331) 
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Table 2 (contd.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Genetic 
distance 
With 
average 
number of 
firms (log) 
for the 
countries 
With Add 
geographical 
controls 
With religion 
linguistics 
and colony 
With 
governance 
indicators 
With 
geographical 
controls, 
religion 
linguistics 
and colony 
and 
governance 
indicators 
With economic 
development 
and law system Full model 
 Start-up rate between two pairs of countries i and j (number of new limited liability firms per 1,000 working-age individuals between two pairs 
of countries i and j) 
Rule of law     -0.4895**   0.1804 
     (-2.5548)   (1.3010) 
Government effectiveness     0.1908   -0.3103* 
     (0.6726)   (-1.9529) 
Control of corruption     -0.1073   -0.0343 
     (-0.6804)   (-0.3390) 
Regulatory quality     0.8295***   0.5901*** 
     (3.4595)   (4.4147) 
Political stability     0.4625***   0.1874** 
     (4.0755)   (2.3142) 
Accountability     -0.0567   -0.0231 
     (-0.7562)   (-0.3537) 
Economic development       0.0000 -0.0000** 
       (0.6291) (-2.5386) 
Efficiency of bankruptcy       0.0089 -0.0211 
       (0.4704) (-1.0319) 
Legal origin UK Both       0.0026 -0.1786 
       (0.0168) (-1.3924) 
Legal origin French Both       0.1212 0.1332** 
       (1.5200) (2.2337) 
Legal origin Socialist Both       -0.1690 -0.0945 
       (-1.4075) (-0.6417) 
Legal origin German Both       -0.1766 0.0223 
       (-1.1073) (0.3149) 
Legal origin Scandinavian 
Both    
   
-1.1615*** -0.7465*** 
       (-10.3366) (-4.0960) 
Constant 1.5311*** 1.3923*** 1.4905*** 0.9360 0.5980*** 0.7386 0.6175*** 0.1700 
 (12.3538) (9.5281) (6.7701) (1.1190) (4.6433) (0.7591) (4.8092) (0.3535) 
Observations (pairwise 
between country I and 
country j) 5,253 5,253 5,253 5,050 5,253 
 
5,050 
2,016 2,016 
R-squared 0.0091 0.0267 0.1037 0.0617 0.2145 0.1215 0.1569 0.3734 
Standardized beta of  
Genetic distance 0.096 0.113 0.046 0.111 0.086 
0.055 
0.126 0.068 
Notes. The dependent variable is start-up rate. The independent variables include genetic distance and a set of 
controls. Refer to the text for detailed variable definitions. The STATA code was obtained from Professor Mitchell 
Petersen’s website and is: dependent_variable independent_variables, fcluster(country i)  tcluster(country j).  
t-statistics in parentheses.  
When running model 1 and 2 just for the smaller sample as in model 3, the results are similar (see Appendix Table 
A3). 
Table A6 (Appendix) presents the list of countries. 
† p < 0.10, *  p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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Table 3 Two-way clustered standard errors bilateral regressions – Nei genetic distance 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
DV = Difference in Start-up rate between two pairs of countries i and j 
(number of new limited liability firms per 1,000 working-age individuals 
between two pairs of countries i and j) 
Genetic distance (Nei) 8.2618* 9.7539* 7.0359** 
 
(1.7705) (1.9389) (1.9886) 
Pairwise average number firms   0.3983** 1.0444*** 
  (2.4800) (6.0747) 
Geodesic distance   0.0176 
 
  (1.0212) 
Latitudinal distance   -0.0019 
 
  (-1.0060) 
Longitudinal distance   0.0007 
 
  (0.5368) 
Contiguous   0.1504 
 
  (1.0469) 
Landlocked   0.0483 
 
  (0.4988) 
Island   0.2547** 
 
  (2.5416) 
Elevation   -0.0001 
 
  (-1.4799) 
North America Both   0.1673 
 
  (0.7513) 
South America Both   -0.4190 
 
  (-1.5291) 
Asia Both   0.3842*** 
 
  (4.0192) 
Africa Both   0.3470 
 
  (0.0000) 
Europe Both   0.0444 
 
  (0.4703) 
Pacific Both   -0.9025*** 
 
  (-3.3669) 
Lingustic Distance   0.0110 
 
  (0.0223) 
Religion distance   0.0365 
 
  (0.6488) 
Colony   -0.1742 
 
  (-1.1099) 
Common Colonizer   -0.0062 
 
  (-0.0578) 
Colonial relationship   0.0946 
 
  (0.6110) 
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Table 3 (contd.) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES 
DV = Difference in Start-up rate between two pairs of countries i and 
j (number of new limited liability firms per 1,000 working-age 
individuals between two pairs of countries i and j) 
Rule of law   0.1844 
   (1.3198) 
Government effectiveness   -0.3058* 
   (-1.9367) 
Control of corruption   -0.0370 
   (-0.3617) 
Regulatory quality   0.5908*** 
   (4.4028) 
Political stability   0.1888** 
   (2.3249) 
Accountability   -0.0258 
   (-0.3941) 
Economic development   -0.0000*** 
   (-2.6714) 
Efficiency of bankrupcy   -0.0227 
   (-1.1109) 
Legal origin UK Both   -0.1837 
   (-1.4272) 
Legal origin French Both   0.1378** 
   (2.3230) 
Legal origin Socialist Both   -0.0961 
   (-0.6521) 
Legal origin German Both   0.0125 
   (0.2004) 
Legal origin Scandinavian Both   -0.7355*** 
   (-3.9948) 
Constant 1.5797*** 1.4536*** 0.1015 
 (12.1795) (9.4568) (0.2119) 
Observations (pairwise between country I 
and country j) 5,253 5,253 2,016 
R-squared 0.0056 0.0219 0.3729 
Standardized beta of  Genetic distance 0.075 0.088 0.064 
Notes. The dependent variable is start-up rate. The independent variables include genetic distance and a set of 
controls. Refer to the text for detailed variable definitions. The Stata code was obtained from Professor Mitchell 
Petersen’s website and is: dependent_variable independent_variables, fcluster(country i)  tcluster(country j).  
Table A6 (Appendix) presents the list of countries. 
t-statistics in parentheses. † p < 0.10, *  p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1 Descriptive statistics (all the variables are for each country-pair) 
  Measured at country-pair 
level 
Definition N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
1 Difference in Start-up 
rate 
The difference in number newly registered companies with limited liability per 
1,000 working-age people (those ages 15-64). 
5,253 
1.71 1.37 0 8.40 
2 Genetic Distance The absolute weighted genetic distance between countries i and j, representing the 
genealogical relatedness of two randomly chosen individuals, one from each 
country (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009: 485). 
5,253 
0.10 0.07 0 0.30 
3 Pairwise average number 
firms 
The (log) average number of firms for the countries that are compared pairwise.  
5,253 
0.26 0.44 -1.76 1.29 
4 Geodesic distance The difference in the distance  (in kilometers) between the major cities of countries 
i and j, divided by 1,000 (Mayer and Zignago 2011).vii 
5,253 
7.30 4.38 0.11 19.54 
5 Latitudinal distance The absolute difference between the latitudes of countries i and j (Mayer and 
Zignago, 2011). 
5,253 
30.77 23.3 0 108.43 
6 Longitudinal distance The absolute difference between the longitudes of countries i and j (Mayer and 
Zignago 2011). 
5,253 
65.04 53.93 0.02 350.02 
7 Contiguous Dummy variable that equals 1 if two countries in a pair are contiguous, that is 
share a common boundary (Mayer and Zignago, 2011).  
5,253 
0.02 0.14 0 1 
8 Landlocked Dummy variable that equals 1 for  both landlocked countries (Mayer and Zignago, 
2011). 
5,253 
0.41 0.49 0 1 
9 Island Dummy variable that equals 1 if either of the countries in a pair is an island. The 
data were obtained from the World Atlas. 
5,253 
0.32 0.47 0 1 
10 Elevation The absolute difference between the average elevation (meters above sea level) of 
countries i and j. The data were obtained from Giuliano et al. (2006). 
5,253 
625.7 642.92 0.02 3187.92 
11 North America Both  
Dummy variables that equal 1 if two countries in a pair were on the same continent 
(Africa, Asia, Europe, North America, South America and the Pacific). The data 
was obtained from Mayer and Zignago (2011).  
5,253 0.01 0.09 0 1 
12 South America Both 5,253 0 0.06 0 1 
13 Asia Both 5,253 0.07 0.25 0 1 
14 Africa Both 5,253 0.05 0.21 0 1 
15 Europe Both 5,253 0.09 0.29 0 1 
16 Pacific Both 5,253 0 0.03 0 1 
17 Linguistic distance Building on  Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009) and drawing from Fearon (2003) is 
equal to: 
LD = √
(15−#common nodes)
15
  
After counting the common linguistic nodes between subgroups in pairs of 
countries, the country #common nodes were calculated by taking the average 
number of common linguistic nodes, weighed by the subgroup population size. 
Linguistic distance is, thus, the weighted index of linguistic similarity between 
countries. 5,050 0.98 0.05 0.57 1 
18 Religion distance The sum of the average absolute difference in the percentage of each religion, 
between countries i and j. The main religions were: Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, 
Hindu, Jewish, and No Religion. The data were obtained from CIA World 
Factbook.viii 5,253 1.04 0.67 0 2 
19 Colony Dummy variable that equals 1 if the countries in each pair have ever had a colonial 
history (Mayer and Zignago 2011). 5,253 0.02 0.13 0 1 
20 Common colonizer  Dummy variable that equals 1 if the countries in each pair had a common colonizer 
after 1945 (Mayer and Zignago, 2011). 5,253 0.07 0.26 0 1 
21 Colonial relationship Dummy variable that equals 1 if the countries in each pair have had a colonial 
relationship after 1945 (Mayer and Zignago, 2011). 5,253 0.01 0.1 0 1 
22 Uncertainty avoidance The absolute difference in uncertainty avoidance between countries i and j. 
Uncertainty avoidance refers to the degree to which individuals feel uncomfortable 
with uncertainty and ambiguity (Hofstede 2011). 1,035 29.71 21.39 0 104 
23 Individualism vs 
Collectivism 
The absolute difference in individualism between countries i and j. Individualism 
relates to the degree to which a country emphasizes individual (“I”) or collective 
achievement (“We”) and interpersonal relationships (Hofstede, 2001). 1,035 28.38 19.61 0 85 
24 Power distance The absolute difference in power distance between countries i and j. It denotes the 
degree of equality or inequality between people in a country (Hofstede, 2001). 1,035 24.97 17.76 0 84 
25 Masculinity vs femininity The absolute difference in masculinity between countries i and j. It denotes the 
degree that a country reinforces the traditional masculine role models of 
achievement, control, and power (Hofstede, 2001). 1,035 21.62 16.77 0 90 
26 Rule of Law  The perception of the extent to which residents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property 
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the extent of crime and violence 
 
 5,253 1.18 0.84 0 3.87 
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27 Control of corruption  It reflects the perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as the 
"capture" of the state by elites and private interests. 5,253 1.23 0.92 0 4.06 
28 Government 
effectiveness 
It represents the perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the 
civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the 
quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government's commitment to such policies. 5,253 1.13 0.81 0 3.80 
29 Voice and accountability It reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, 
freedom of association, and a free media. 5,253 1.08 0.77 0 3.67 
30 Political stability  It reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated 
violence and terrorism. 5,253 1.11 0.84 0 4.11 
31 Bankruptcy costs The efficiency of bankruptcy law, using a scale from 0 to 6, where higher scores 
indicate higher compliance (Mihet 2013). The data were obtained from the World 
Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report (2005). 2,016 1.99 1.73 0 6.70 
32 Economic development The average of the 2008 and 2009 GDP per capita, which is the gross domestic 
product in current U.S. dollars divided by mid-year population. The data were 
available from Worldbank.ix 5,253 
21,36
5.86 
22,002.3
1 2.47 
105,020.
10 
33 Legal origin UK Both Dummy variables that equal 1 if the two countries in a pair have the same legal 
origin (La Porta et al. 1999).x 
5,253 0.09 0.29 0 1 
34 Legal origin French Both 5,253 0.16 0.36 0 1 
35 Legal origin Socialist 
Both 5,253 0.04 0.20 0 1 
36 Legal origin German 
Both 5,253 0 0.03 0 1 
37 Legal origin 
Scandinavian Both 5,253 0 0.04 0 1 
Notes. This table reports the summary statistics and the correlation between the variables of the study. Table A2 
(Appendix) reports the correlation matrix between the variables. † p < 0.10, *  p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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Table A2 Pairwise Correlations 
 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Start-up rate 1        
2 Genetic Distance 0.10*** 1       
3 
Pairwise average number 
firms 0.12*** -0.13*** 1      
4 Geodesic distance 0.09*** 0.33*** 0.03** 1     
5 Latitudinal distance 0.04*** 0.23*** 0.23*** 0.49*** 1    
6 Longitudinal distance 0.09*** 0.15*** 0.01 0.85*** 0.13*** 1   
7 Contiguous -0.07*** -0.13*** -0.03** -0.22*** -0.17*** -0.16*** 1  
8 Landlocked 0.11*** 0.17*** 0.20*** -0.10*** -0.01 -0.14*** 0.01 1 
9 Island 0.14*** 0.09*** 0.18*** 0.34*** 0.09*** 0.40*** -0.09*** -0.22*** 
10 Elevation 0.00 0.09*** -0.13*** 0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.04** 0.46*** 
11 North America Both -0.00 0.02 -0.02* -0.11*** -0.08*** -0.09*** 0.06*** -0.08*** 
12 South America Both -0.03* -0.02 -0.01 -0.06*** -0.03† -0.06*** 0.18*** -0.02 
13 Asia Both 0.00 -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.22*** -0.17*** -0.16*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 
14 Africa Both 0.06*** -0.13*** -0.11*** -0.18*** -0.08*** -0.17*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 
15 Europe Both -0.18*** -0.31*** 0.19*** -0.43*** -0.31*** -0.31*** 0.16*** -0.08*** 
16 Pacific Both 0.03* -0.01 0.04*** -0.03* -0.01 0.07*** 0.00 -0.03* 
17 Linguistic distance 0.08*** 0.25*** -0.02 0.16*** 0.05*** 0.14*** -0.22*** 0.08*** 
18 Religion distance 0.14*** -0.03* -0.19*** 0.06*** -0.11*** 0.09*** -0.10*** 0.06*** 
19 Colony -0.01 -0.04** 0.07*** -0.05*** 0.00 -0.05*** 0.18*** -0.05*** 
20 Common colonizer  0.03* 0.05*** -0.04*** -0.06*** -0.12*** -0.02† 0.07*** 0.01 
21 Colonial relationship 0.03† 0.00 0.07*** -0.04* 0.01 -0.04*** 0.08*** -0.03† 
22 Uncertainty avoidance -0.01 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.04 -0.04 0.04 -0.10** -0.11*** 
23 
Individualism vs 
collectivism 0.15*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.14*** 0.17*** 0.17*** -0.12*** -0.03 
24 Power distance 0.08* 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 -0.07* 0.11*** 
25 Masculinity vs femininity -0.11*** -0.02 0.13*** -0.11*** -0.03 -0.07* -0.06† 0.20*** 
26 Rule of Law  0.26*** -0.02 0.21*** 0.00 0.09*** 0.02 -0.09*** 0.03* 
27 Control of corruption  0.24*** -0.05*** 0.3*** 0.02 0.10*** 0.03* -0.09*** 0.00 
28 Government effectiveness 0.30*** 0.03* 0.21*** 0.01 0.09*** 0.01 -0.09*** 0.01 
29 Voice and accountability 0.19*** -0.03* 0.11*** -0.03* 0.06*** -0.03* -0.09*** 0.14*** 
30 Political stability  0.30*** -0.01 -0.08*** 0.02 -0.04*** 0.05*** -0.08*** 0.04** 
31 Bankruptcy costs -0.02 -0.15*** -0.04* -0.07*** -0.08*** -0.03 -0.07** 0.12*** 
32 Economic development 0.08*** -0.11*** 0.31*** -0.07*** 0.10*** -0.07*** -0.07*** 0.02 
33 Legal origin UK Both 0.08*** 0.13*** 0.01 0.10*** -0.01 0.12*** 0.02 -0.01 
34 Legal origin French Both 0.04* -0.02† -0.13*** -0.01 -0.06*** -0.03* 0.04* -0.09*** 
35 Legal origin Socialist Both -0.10*** -0.14*** 0.04*** -0.22*** -0.16*** -0.16*** 0.17*** 0.09*** 
36 Legal origin German Both -0.02† -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03* 0.00 0.11*** 0.03* 
37 
Legal origin Scandinavian 
Both -0.04** -0.04** 0.05*** -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.04* 0.09*** -0.04* 
Notes. This table reports the correlation between the main variables of the study  † p < 0.10, *  p < 0.05; ** p < 
0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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Table A2 (contd.) 
  
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
9 Island 1       
10 Elevation -0.10*** 1      
11 North America Both 0.07*** -0.03** 1     
12 South America Both -0.04*** 0.01 -0.01 1    
13 Asia Both 0.01 0.15*** -0.02† -0.02 1   
14 Africa Both -0.11*** -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.06*** 1  
15 Europe Both -0.06*** -0.14*** -0.03* -0.02 -0.09*** -0.07*** 1 
16 Pacific Both 0.05*** -0.02 0.00 0 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
17 Linguistic distance 0.09*** 0.04* -0.16*** -0.30*** 0.06*** -0.22*** -0.07*** 
18 Religion distance -0.01 0.10*** -0.10** -0.04*** 0.07*** 0 -0.23*** 
19 Colony 0.03† -0.04* 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.02 
20 Common colonizer  0.06*** 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.1*** 0.21*** -0.07*** 
21 Colonial relationship 0.05*** -0.03† -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.02† 
22 Uncertainty avoidance 0.23*** 0.00 0.06† -0.09** 0.02 -0.01 0.03 
23 
Individualism vs 
collectivism 0.05 -0.01 0.08* -0.06† -0.14*** -0.01 -0.23*** 
24 Power distance 0.03 -0.09** 0.03 -0.09** -0.01 0.01 -0.11** 
25 Masculinity vs femininity -0.04 0.00 0.01 -0.02 -0.06† -0.02 0.18*** 
26 Rule of Law  0.06*** 0.07*** 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.14*** -0.07*** 
27 Control of corruption  0.09*** 0.01 -0.01 -0.02† -0.01 -0.13*** -0.01 
28 Government effectiveness 0.07*** 0.02† 0.00 -0.04* -0.02 -0.12*** -0.06*** 
29 Voice and accountability -0.04** 0.08*** -0.03* -0.04** -0.11*** -0.08*** -0.16*** 
30 Political stability  0.02 0.10*** -0.02† -0.01 0.08*** -0.05*** -0.17*** 
31 Bankruptcy costs -0.08*** 0.13*** -0.03 -0.03 0.11*** -0.07** -0.04† 
32 Economic development 0.01 -0.05*** -0.02 -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.19*** 0.10*** 
33 Legal origin UK Both 0.15*** 0.04** 0.01 -0.02 0.06*** 0.09*** -0.10*** 
34 Legal origin French Both -0.04** -0.08*** 0.05** 0.15*** -0.07*** 0.04* -0.06*** 
35 Legal origin Socialist Both -0.14*** 0.07*** -0.02 -0.01 0.05** -0.05*** 0.15*** 
36 Legal origin German Both 0.01 0.00 0.00 0 -0.01 -0.01 0.05*** 
37 
Legal origin Scandinavian 
Both 0.01 -0.02* 0.00 0 -0.01 -0.01 0.14*** 
Notes. This table reports the correlation between the main variables of the study  † p < 0.10, *  p < 0.05; ** p < 
0.01; *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 41 
Table A2 (contd.) 
  16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
16 Pacific Both 1       
17 Linguistic distance -0.01 1      
18 Religion distance -0.01 0.26*** 1     
19 Colony 0 -0.10*** -0.05*** 1    
20 Common colonizer  0.01 -0.03* 0.05** -0.04** 1   
21 Colonial relationship 0 0 0 0.74*** -0.03* 1  
22 Uncertainty avoidance -0.04 0.24*** -0.03 -0.10** 0.07* -0.04 1 
23 Individualism vs 
collectivism 
-0.03 0.11*** 0.03 0.02 -0.07* 0.13 0.05 
24 Power distance -0.02 0.16*** 0.02 -0.05 0 0.03 0.09* 
25 Masculinity vs femininity -0.03 0.05 -0.05 -0.09*** -0.14*** -0.06† 0.03 
26 Rule of Law  0 0.09*** 0.04** 0 -0.10*** 0.03† 0.07* 
27 Control of corruption  0.02 0.10*** 0.04** -0.01 -0.08*** 0.02 0.14*** 
28 Government effectiveness 0.02 0.11*** 0.06*** 0 -0.05*** 0.03* 0.13*** 
29 Voice and accountability -0.01 0.16*** 0.24*** -0.01 -0.11*** 0.03† -0.01 
30 Political stability  -0.02 0.09*** 0.22*** -0.04** 0.02 -0.02 -0.06† 
31 Bankruptcy costs -0.02 0.12*** 0.04 -0.04† 0.02 0.00 0.26*** 
32 Economic development 0.01 0.12*** -0.05*** 0.02 -0.10*** 0.03* 0.07* 
33 Legal origin UK Both 0.10*** -0.04** 0.06*** 0.10*** 0.43*** 0.12*** -0.11*** 
34 Legal origin French Both -0.01 -0.17*** -0.01 0.06*** -0.05*** 0.02 -0.21*** 
35 Legal origin Socialist Both -0.01 -0.04* -0.04** 0.06*** 0.15*** 0.09*** -0.08* 
36 Legal origin German Both 0 -0.06*** 0 0 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 
37 Legal origin Scandinavian 
Both 
0 -0.03 -0.03 0.06*** -0.01 0.00 -0.03 
Notes. This table reports the correlation between the main variables of the study  † p < 0.10, *  p < 0.05; ** p < 
0.01; *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Table A2 (contd.) 
  23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
23 Individualism vs 
Collectivism 
1       
24 Power distance 0.3*** 1      
25 Masculinity vs femininity 0.02 0.07* 1     
26 Rule of Law  0.37*** 0.36*** -0.02 1    
27 Control of corruption  0.29*** 0.34*** 0.02 0.89*** 1   
28 Government effectiveness 0.35*** 0.32*** -0.01 0.89*** 0.88*** 1  
29 Voice and accountability 0.38*** 0.34*** -0.03 0.63*** 0.56*** 0.57*** 1 
30 Political stability  0.24*** 0.22*** -0.09** 0.51*** 0.45*** 0.41*** 0.35*** 
31 Bankruptcy costs 0.35*** 0.38*** -0.02 0.40*** 0.36*** 0.41*** 0.45*** 
32 Economic development 0.36*** 0.31*** 0.20*** 0.60*** 0.66*** 0.61*** 0.38*** 
33 Legal origin UK Both 0.10** -0.01 -0.22*** -0.03* 0.01 0.02 -0.10*** 
34 Legal origin French Both -0.06† -0.20*** -0.11*** -0.04* -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.01 
35 Legal origin Socialist Both 0.00 0.01 0.04 -0.06*** -0.10*** -0.07*** 0.03* 
36 Legal origin German Both -0.06 -0.01 -0.03 -0.04* -0.03* -0.04* -0.03* 
37 Legal origin Scandinavian 
Both 
-0.07* -0.05 -0.05 -0.06*** -0.05*** -0.05** -0.06*** 
Notes. This table reports the correlation between the main variables of the study  † p < 0.10, *  p < 0.05; ** p < 
0.01; *** p < 0.001 
 
 1 
 2 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
 42 
Table A2 (contd.) 
  30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
30 Political stability  1       
31 Bankruptcy costs -0.01 1      
32 Economic development 0.23*** 0.22*** 1     
33 Legal origin UK Both 0.06*** -0.06* -0.04* 1    
34 Legal origin French Both -0.01 -0.15*** -0.03* -0.14*** 1   
35 Legal origin Socialist Both -0.08*** 0.03 -0.13*** -0.07*** -0.09*** 1  
36 Legal origin German Both -0.03* -0.04† -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 1 
37 Legal origin Scandinavian 
Both 
-0.05** -0.05* -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 
Notes. This table reports the correlation between the main variables of the study  
 † p < 0.10, *  p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001
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Table A3 Two-way clustered standard errors bilateral regressions – casewise deletion for each model 
(same specification as in Table 2) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Genetic 
distance 
With average 
number of 
firms (log) for 
the countries 
With 
geographical 
controls 
With 
religion 
linguistics 
and colony 
With 
governance 
indicators 
With 
geographical 
controls, 
religion 
linguistics 
and colony 
and 
governance 
indicators 
With 
economic 
development 
and law 
system Full model 
 Start-up rate between two pairs of countries i and j (number of new limited liability firms per 1,000 working-age individuals between two 
pairs of countries i and j) 
Genetic distance 2.5798*** 2.4663*** 1.3772* 2.3302** 2.0710*** 1.3945* 2.4634** 1.3244* 
 
(3.3914) (2.6104) (1.8467) (2.5664) (2.6505) (1.8220) (2.4921) (1.7884) 
Pairwise average number firms   0.8671*** 0.8827*** 0.9088*** 0.9227*** 0.8963*** 0.9001*** 1.0411*** 
  (4.5026) (4.6317) (4.8432) (5.3647) (4.7110) (4.6765) (6.0658) 
Geodesic distance   0.0031   0.0011  0.0171 
 
  (0.1376)   (0.0497)  (0.9788) 
Latitudinal distance   -0.0003   0.0002  -0.0018 
 
  (-0.1032)   (0.0813)  (-0.9396) 
Longitudinal distance   0.0014   0.0015  0.0008 
 
  (0.7870)   (0.8462)  (0.5646) 
Contiguous   0.0131   0.0610  0.1465 
 
  (0.1063)   (0.5037)  (1.0198) 
Landlocked   -0.0334   -0.0343  0.0437 
 
  (-0.3806)   (-0.3719)  (0.4418) 
Island   0.3020**   0.2949**  0.2547** 
 
  (2.3796)   (2.3527)  (2.5683) 
Elevation   -0.0002**   -0.0002**  -0.0001 
 
  (-2.4680)   (-2.3175)  (-1.4838) 
North America Both   0.0017   0.0073  0.0232 
 
  (0.0453)   (0.2074)  (0.7245) 
South America Both   0.0066   0.0102  -0.2081 
 
  (0.0404)   (0.0643)  (-1.5357) 
Asia Both   0.1096**   0.1069**  0.1306*** 
 
  (2.5478)   (2.4678)  (4.0029) 
Africa Both   0.1221***   0.1149***  0.1053 
 
  (4.9192)   (4.5499)  (0.000) 
Europe Both   -0.0373   -0.0319  0.0094 
 
  (-1.2489)   (-1.1305)  (0.4998) 
Pacific Both   -0.2493***   -0.2435***  -0.1502*** 
 
  (-6.4189)   (-6.3777)  (-3.3939) 
Lingustic Distance    0.1872  -0.0347  -0.0743 
 
   (0.2873)  (-0.0626)  (-0.1469) 
Religion distance    0.1288  0.0594  0.0346 
 
   (1.6198)  (0.8119)  (0.6215) 
Colony    -0.1885  -0.2109  -0.1745 
 
   (-0.9146)  (-0.9600)  (-1.1129) 
Common Colonizer    0.0719  -0.0233  -0.0161 
 
   (0.4275)  (-0.1795)  (-0.1449) 
Colonial relationship    0.2919  0.1949  0.0969 
 
   (1.4638)  (1.0749)  (0.6331) 
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Table A3 (contd.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Genetic 
distance 
With average 
number of 
firms (log) for 
the countries 
With Add 
geographical 
controls 
With 
religion 
linguistics 
and colony 
With 
governance 
indicators 
With 
geographical 
controls, 
religion 
linguistics 
and colony 
and 
governance 
indicators 
With 
economic 
developm
ent and 
law 
system Full model 
 Start-up rate between two pairs of countries i and j (number of new limited liability firms per 1,000 working-age individuals between two 
pairs of countries i and j) 
Rule of law     0.0993   0.1804 
     (0.6373)   (1.3010) 
Government effectiveness     -0.4476***   -0.3103* 
     (-2.7938)   (-1.9529) 
Control of corruption     0.0213   -0.0343 
     (0.1934)   (-0.3390) 
Regulatory quality     0.6795***   0.5901*** 
     (4.7570)   (4.4147) 
Political stability     0.2274***   0.1874** 
     (2.5935)   (2.3142) 
Accountability     -0.0873   -0.0231 
     (-1.4831)   (-0.3537) 
Economic development       0.0000 -0.0000** 
       (0.6291) (-2.5386) 
Efficiency of bankrutpcy       0.0089 -0.0211 
       (0.4704) (-1.0319) 
Legal origin UK Both       0.0026 -0.1786 
       (0.0168) (-1.3924) 
Legal origin French Both       0.1212 0.1332** 
       (1.5200) (2.2337) 
Legal origin Socialist Both       -0.1690 -0.0945 
       (-1.4075) (-0.6417) 
Legal origin German Both       -0.1766 0.0223 
       (-1.1073) (0.3149) 
Legal origin Scandinavian 
Both    
   
-1.1615*** -0.7465*** 
       (-10.3366) (-4.0960) 
Constant 1.0178*** 0.6769*** 0.6474*** 0.3704 0.2523** 0.6068 0.6175*** 0.1700 
 (12.5741) (7.5144) (4.7069) (0.5992) (2.2275) (1.2010) (4.8092) (0.3535) 
Observations (pairwise 
between country I and country 
j) 2,016 2,016 2,016 2,016 2,016 2,016 2,016 2,016 
R-squared 0.0299 0.1457 0.2319 0.1582 0.2975 0.2348 0.1569 0.3734 
Standardized beta of  Genetic 
distance 0.125 0.148 0.060 0.145 0.113 0.072 0.165 0.089 
 
Notes. The dependent variable is start-up rate. The independent variables include genetic distance and a set of 
controls. Refer to the text for detailed variable definitions. The Stata code was obtained from Professor Mitchell 
Petersen’s website and is: dependent_variable independent_variables, fcluster(country i)  tcluster(country j).  
t-statistics in parentheses. † p < 0.10, *  p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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Table A4 Two-way clustered standard errors bilateral regressions – casewise deletion for each model 
(same specification as in Table 2, now including Cultural dimensions) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Genetic 
distance 
With average 
number of 
firms (log) for 
the countries 
With Add 
geographical 
controls 
With cultural 
dimensions 
With religion 
linguistics 
and colony 
With 
governance 
indicators 
With 
economic 
development 
and law 
system 
Full model 
 
DV = Difference in Start-up rate between two pairs of countries i and j (number of new limited liability firms per 1,000 working-
age individuals between two pairs of countries i and j) 
Genetic distance 3.3627*** 3.5443** 2.1847* 3.3402** 3.1447** 3.0311** 3.5712** 2.2254** 
 
(2.6579) (2.3250) (1.9423) (2.2793) (2.1239) (2.2106) (2.4493) (2.1954) 
Pairwise average number firms   0.7616*** 0.7017*** 0.7837*** 0.7623*** 0.7438*** 0.8342*** 0.9019*** 
  (3.3052) (2.9224) (3.3837) (3.2960) (3.6533) (3.6172) (4.0509) 
Geodesic distance   0.0122     0.0336** 
 
  (0.5890)     (2.0580) 
Latitudinal distance   -0.0007     -0.0038** 
 
  (-0.3309)     (-2.0213) 
Longitudinal distance   0.0023     0.0010 
 
  (1.4007)     (0.7965) 
Contiguous   -0.0381     0.0505 
 
  (-0.2552)     (0.2904) 
Landlocked   0.1383     0.1929 
 
  (0.8598)     (1.0639) 
Island   0.1627     0.1583* 
 
  (1.2508)     (1.7024) 
Elevation   -0.0002     -0.0002 
 
  (-1.6146)     (-1.5979) 
North America Both   0.0263     0.0451 
 
  (0.7368)     (1.3264) 
South America Both   0.0925     -0.0932 
 
  (0.6350)     (-0.8006) 
Asia Both   0.2718***     0.2733*** 
 
  (6.8898)     (14.5709) 
Africa Both   0.1739***     0.2726*** 
 
  (4.2250)     (6.2945) 
Europe Both   0.0086     0.0433* 
 
  (0.3406)     (1.8713) 
Pacific Both   -0.1771***     -0.1211** 
 
  (-4.3432)     (-2.3062) 
Lingustic Distance     0.9454   0.2783 
 
    (1.0562)   (0.3634) 
Religion distance     0.0112   0.0176 
 
    (0.1042)   (0.1966) 
Colony     -0.2253   -0.2221* 
 
    (-0.8660)   (-1.6709) 
Common Colonizer     -0.1940   -0.6471*** 
 
    (-0.9591)   (-3.9568) 
Colonial relationship     0.1678   0.0883 
 
    (0.4398)   (0.4296) 
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Table A4 (contd.) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Genetic 
distance 
With average 
number of 
firms (log) 
for the 
countries 
With Add 
geographical 
controls 
With 
cultural 
dimensions 
With 
religion 
linguistics 
and colony 
With 
governance 
indicators 
With 
economic 
development 
and law 
system 
Full model 
 
= Start-up rate between two pairs of countries i and j (number of new limited liability firms per 1,000 working-age 
individuals between two pairs of countries i and j) 
Power distance    0.0079**    0.0048* 
    (1.9677)    (1.7397) 
Uncertainty avoidance    -0.0009    -0.0036** 
    (-0.4819)    (-2.0870) 
Individualism vs Collectivism    0.0019    0.0029 
    (0.6025)    (1.2374) 
Masculinity vs femininity    -0.0039*    -0.0026 
    (-1.9264)    (-1.0328) 
Rule of law      -0.1042  -0.0134 
      (-0.6458)  (-0.0970) 
Government effectiveness      -0.6429***  -0.6902*** 
      (-3.3345)  (-4.0708) 
Control of corruption      0.3836**  0.3911*** 
      (2.4004)  (2.8352) 
Regulatory quality      0.7329***  0.6432*** 
      (3.9934)  (3.9705) 
Political stability      0.1552  0.1118 
      (1.3858)  (1.3798) 
Accountability      -0.2186***  -0.2280** 
      (-2.9784)  (-2.2423) 
Economic development       -0.0000* -0.0000 
       (-1.7213) (-1.5889) 
Efficiency of bankruptcy       0.2277** 0.0413 
       (2.4950) (0.3686) 
Legal origin UK Both       -0.1394 -0.3178 
       (-0.7679) (-1.6241) 
Legal origin French Both       0.0750 0.2039** 
       (0.6524) (2.0164) 
Legal origin Socialist Both       0.2951 0.2107 
       (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Legal origin German Both       -0.1110 -0.1476 
       (-0.7732) (-1.0106) 
Legal origin Scandinavian Both       -1.0181*** -0.8799*** 
       (-6.4625) (-3.6877) 
Constant 1.0391*** 0.6699*** 0.4980*** 0.5426*** -0.2087 0.3557** 0.4382*** -0.1795 
 (9.0250) (5.1858) (3.7060) (3.5340) (-0.2482) (2.2366) (2.6390) (-0.2575) 
Observations 820 820 820 820 820 820 820 820 
R-squared 0.0426 0.1262 0.2096 0.1599 0.1352 0.2718 0.1752 0.3798 
Standardized beta of  Genetic 
distance 0.206 0.218 0.134 0.205 0.193 0.186 0.219 0.137 
 
Notes. The dependent variable is start-up rate. The independent variables include genetic distance and a set of 
controls. Refer to the text for detailed variable definitions. The Stata code was obtained from Professor Mitchell 
Petersen’s website and is: dependent_variable independent_variables, fcluster(country i)  tcluster(country j).  
t-statistics in parentheses. † p < 0.10, *  p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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Table A5 Two-way clustered standard errors bilateral regressions – casewise deletion for each model 
using World Value Survey (WVS) Cultural distance measure 
 (1) (2) 
 
DV = Differences in Start-up rate between two pairs of 
countries i and j (number of new limited liability firms per 
1,000 working-age individuals between two pairs of 
countries i and j) 
   
Genetic distance 1.4830* 1.7525* 
 
(1.6757) (1.9206) 
Pairwise average number firms  0.7487*** 0.7842*** 
 (3.0404) (3.1659) 
Geodesic distance -0.0028 0.0068 
 
(-0.1321) (0.3987) 
Latitudinal distance 0.0006 -0.0001 
 
(0.2501) (-0.0514) 
Longitudinal distance 0.0019 0.0018* 
 
(1.4241) (1.7502) 
Contiguous 0.2109 0.1903 
 
(1.3800) (1.2614) 
Landlocked 0.1758 0.1639 
 
(1.3403) (1.1590) 
Island 0.3924*** 0.3287*** 
 
(3.3003) (2.9357) 
Elevation -0.0001 -0.0001 
 
(-1.1690) (-1.1658) 
North America Both -0.1941 -0.1464 
 
(-1.0442) (-0.7288) 
South America Both -0.2674 -0.2773 
 
(-0.8415) (-0.8108) 
Asia Both 0.2308* 0.2181* 
 
(1.8029) (1.7947) 
Africa Both 0.8380*** 0.8787*** 
 
(14.8223) (11.3016) 
Europe Both 0.1027 0.1989 
 
(0.8030) (1.4369) 
Pacific Both -0.5743 -0.3699 
 
(-1.2760) (-0.8130) 
Linguistic Distance -0.3551 -0.4171 
 
(-0.4827) (-0.6547) 
Religion distance -0.0452 -0.0266 
 
(-0.5992) (-0.3330) 
Colony -0.1470 -0.1555 
 
(-0.8243) (-0.8975) 
Common Colonizer 0.0121 0.1121 
 
(0.0783) (0.7713) 
Colonial relationship 0.3229 0.3351 
 
(1.3572) (1.6194) 
WVS: Cultural distance Index 0.0050***  
 (2.7429)  
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Table A5 (contd.) 
 (1) (2) 
 
DV = Differences in Start-up rate between two pairs of countries i and j (number of 
new limited liability firms per 1,000 working-age individuals between two pairs of 
countries i and j) 
   
WVS: Perceptions of Life  -0.0062* 
  (-1.7537) 
WVS: Work  -0.0023 
  (-0.3537) 
WVS: Family  0.0175 
  (1.3040) 
WVS:  Politics and Society  0.0085 
  (1.5922) 
WVS:  Religion and Morale  0.0212* 
  (1.8046) 
WVS:  National Identity  0.0304 
  (1.5204) 
Rule of law 0.0825 0.0490 
 (0.6893) (0.4401) 
Government effectiveness -0.2362 -0.2636 
 (-1.2555) (-1.3190) 
Control of corruption -0.0686 -0.0362 
 (-0.7186) (-0.3500) 
Regulatory quality 0.5422*** 0.5326*** 
 (3.4421) (3.3498) 
Political stability 0.2570*** 0.2216** 
 (2.6519) (2.3937) 
Accountability -0.0818 -0.0308 
 (-0.7895) (-0.3180) 
Economic development -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 
 (-3.5324) (-2.8066) 
Efficiency of bankruptcy -0.0142 -0.0008 
 (-0.4549) (-0.0239) 
Legal origin UK Both -0.1147 -0.1548 
 (-0.3289) (-0.4314) 
Legal origin French Both 0.0578 0.0118 
 (0.8067) (0.1509) 
Legal origin Socialist Both 0.0306 -0.0482 
 (0.1689) (-0.2682) 
Legal origin German Both -0.1309 -0.0775 
 (.) (-1.1293) 
Legal origin Scandinavian Both -0.5942*** -0.6886*** 
 (-3.0366) (-3.5035) 
Constant 0.7053 0.6928 
 (0.9711) (1.1027) 
Observations 1,128 1,128 
R-squared 0.3616 0.3800 
Standardized beta of  Genetic distance 0.098 0.116 
Notes. The dependent variable is start-up rate. The independent variables include genetic distance and a set of 
controls. Refer to the text for detailed variable definitions. The Stata code was obtained from Professor Mitchell 
Petersen’s website and is: dependent_variable independent_variables, fcluster(country i)  tcluster(country j).  
t-statistics in parentheses. † p < 0.10, *  p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001. 
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Table A6 List of countries in the sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Afghanistan 2. El Salvador 3. Kyrgyzstan 4. Rwanda 
5. Albania 6. Ethiopia 7. Latvia 8. Senegal 
9. Algeria 10. Finland 11. Lesotho 12. Sierra Leone 
13. Argentina 14. France 15. Lithuania 16. Singapore 
17. Armenia 18. Gabon 19. Luxembourg 20. Slovenia 
21. Australia 22. Georgia 23. Malawi 24. South Africa 
25. Austria 26. Germany 27. Malta 28. Spain 
29. Azerbaijan 30. Ghana 31. Mauritius 32. Sri Lanka 
33. Bangladesh 34. Greece 35. Mexico 36. Suriname 
37. Belarus 38. Guatemala 39. Moldova 40. Sweden 
41. Belgium 42. Haiti 43. Morocco 44. Switzerland 
45. Bhutan 46. Hong Kong 47. Namibia 48. Tajikistan 
49. Bolivia 50. Hungary 51. Nepal 52. Thailand 
53. Botswana 54. Iceland 55. Netherlands 56. Togo 
57. Brazil 58. India 59. New Zealand 60. Tonga 
61. Bulgaria 62. Indonesia 63. Niger 64. Tunisia 
65. Burkina Faso 66. Iraq 67. Nigeria 68. Turkey 
69. Canada 70. Ireland 71. Norway 72. U.S.A 
73. Chile 74. Israel 75. Oman 76. Uganda 
77. Colombia 78. Italy 79. Pakistan 80. Ukraine 
81. Costa Rica 82. Jamaica 83. Philippines 84. United Arab 
Emirates 
85. Croatia 86. Japan 87. Poland 88. United Kingdom 
89. Czech Republic 90. Jordan 91. Portugal 92. Uruguay 
93. Denmark 94. Kazakhstan 95. Qatar 96. Uzbekistan 
97. Dominica 98. Kenya 99. Romania 100. Zambia 
101. Dominican Republic 102. Kiribati 103. Russian 
Federation 
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ENDNOTES 
 
 
                                                 
i The data are available at: http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/entrepreneurship 
ii We focus on the US for two reasons. First, it is considered the “world technological frontier” (Spolaore and Wacziarg, 2009) and 
second, all previous genetic distance studies used genetic distance relative to the US. 
iii In the cases where we did not have data for all of the years, we used the average of the available years. 
iv The data are available at:  http://www.census.gov/ces/dataproducts/bds/data_firm.html 
v The data are available at:  http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/USAWFPNA#. 
vi The data are available at:  http://sites.tufts.edu/enricospolaore/. 
vii The data are available from Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) at 
http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/download.asp?id=6. 
viii The data is available at: http://gsociology.icaap.org/data/religion.xls  and https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/2122.html . 
ix The data are available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?page=1. 
x The data are available at: http://faculty.tuck.dartmouth.edu/rafael-laporta/research-publications. 
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